But then we turn to brass tacks, including the scope of the Constitution's anti-corruption principle: here Teachout and I disagree. Teachout's position is that because election-related "corruption" connected to corporate campaign contributions and spending was unknown to the Framers and their era, it would be unreasonable to expect the Framers' text to deal with this specific type of corruption. Thus it is no surprise that Congress lacks an express Article I power over election-related contributions and spending, corporate or otherwise. After all, "it is a constitution we are expounding,"
6 not a prolix document dealing with cases and situations wholly unknown and unforeseen by those who created it. So recognizing that the text of the Constitution is a somewhat incomplete agreement, Teachout turns to higher level principles. She argues that because the primary purpose of many constitutional provisions was to prevent corruption, the Constitution implicitly permits Congress to enact legislation regulating federal (and, perhaps, state) corporate campaign contributions and spending. In so doing, we moderns would be furthering the Framers' eighteenth-century purposes.
There are three primary reasons why Teachout's interpretive strategy does not work. First, Teachout misstates the scope of the constitutional provisions on which her analysis relies. Some of these provisions use Office language in any of several cognate forms. The particular Office language used varies from constitutional provision to provision. Other provisions refer expressly to elected federal officials, with the precise scope of each clause-what office or offices the clause applies to-varying from clause to clause. In her Cornell Law Review article, Teachout implied that the Foreign Emoluments Clause's proscription against foreign government giftgiving and its Office . . . under the United States language, reaches all elected federal officials. Here, on Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, she has defended that interpretation; indeed, she has expanded on it by expressly arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause's Office . . . under the United States language reaches both elected federal positions, including members of Congress, and also elected state officials. Teachout's position is sui generis. The prevailing view is that the Constitution embraces a global officer-member distinction. So Teachout's position has profound implications for both the Foreign Emoluments Clause (and Teachout's anti-corruption principle) and for every other constitutional provision using Office language.
I believe Teachout is wrong about the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and its Office . . . under the United States language. As I will explain, my position is that Office . . . under the United States reaches only holders of appointed federal statutory offices, not elected or constitutionally created positions. If my analysis is correct, then the force of Teachout's key analogy falls. If, as I have argued, the Framers extended the proscription against foreign government gift giving to appointed officers and chose language which did not reach elected officials (although such language was readily at hand), then the scope of Teachout's anti-corruption principle-to the extent it is reliant on the Foreign Emoluments Clausewould be similarly limited.
Second, the varying Office language throughout the Constitution poses other difficulties for Teachout's analysis. Let us imagine the Constitution had thirty provisions directed against "corruption." If each of the thirty provisions used language reaching all elected federal officials, then we might have reason to conclude that the Constitution embraced a nontextual or implicit structural anti-corruption principle. And if in the fullness of time a form of corruption came about which was unknown to the Framers, then even if such a form of corruption was not squarely addressed by any express constitutional provision, we might have reason to conclude that the Framers' anti-corruption principle would function like an express Article I enumerated power. Moreover, the scope of that power would permit congressional regulation in regard to every elected federal office. Why? Because each constitutional provision which gave rise to the anti-corruption principle reached every elected official. Now, let us again imagine the Constitution had thirty provisions directed against "corruption." Five provisions relate to House members; five provisions relate to Senate members; five provisions relate to the presidency (and vice presidency). A further five provisions relate to the House and Senate; five more relate to the Senate and President; the last five relate to federal electors and state elected officials commanding federal powers. Here the situation is more complex. In these circumstances, if in the fullness of time we discover a form of corruption unknown to the Framers, although we might agree that the Framers were against corruption as an abstract matter, and although we might agree that the Constitution embraces some sort of nontextual or implicit anti-corruption principle, we have no clear way to identify the precise scope of that principle. To whom or what institutions would it apply? Representatives, senators, the President, the Vice President?
Our Constitution is much more like the one described in the latter hypothetical, as opposed to the former. Indeed, even when referring to Officers, the Constitution embraces much diverse language. So the precise scope of the anti-corruption principle-in the context of corporate campaign contributions and spending-is something Teachout has to explain and defend. She cannot argue that every provision of the actual Constitution covers every elected official. She could turn to the best analogical clause, but that would be the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which does not refer to any elected officials. So what is left? She could take a center-of-gravity approach: most of the most important anti-corruption provisions embrace most elected officials, at least, in most circumstances. Such an approach would face many difficult conceptual problems; it would require the interpreters' weighing or summing lawmakers' original intent or purposes across multiple constitutional provisions. Teachout never gives us an analysis along these lines. And this is not surprising. The final language of most (if not all) of the Constitution's anti-corruption provisions was the product of debate and compromise. Indeed, the varying Office language across constitutional provisions is itself some indication that the Framers actively considered the scope of these provisions. Why vary the language unless one intended to vary the scope?
7 In other words, preventing or limiting corruption was a goal of the Framers, but it competed with other principles and policy goals. With regard to each anti-corruption provision, different compromises were struck and different offices and positions were encompassed by the scope of each clause. That poses a substantial problem for Teachout's analysis. Teachout can argue that the Framers would have addressed, in some fashion, this issue had they experienced the form of corruption that interests us here: corporate campaign contributions and expenditures. But given that minimizing corruption competed with other principles and policy goals, it is difficult to see how Teachout could predict what compromise the Framers would have struck had they considered a problem with which they had no experience. If there is no neutral way to translate the anti-corruption principle into our modern context and at the same time to translate the other principles and policy goals with which it competed, then we are adrift without compass, map, or star to guide us. All we have is an abstract anti-corruption principle, but we have no way to determine if it encompassed or should encompass any particular (much less all) elected positions. 7 Indeed, in regard to some anti-corruption provisions, the Framers had language from the Articles of Confederation at hand. But they changed that language. Under the Articles of Confederation, delegates were not "capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2 (emphasis added) (link). The Incompatibility Clause of the Constitution of 1787 has no comparable language. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N] Finally, Teachout argues that the anti-corruption principle is akin to separation of powers or federalism principles, long embraced by the courts and the public. She argues that the anti-corruption principle does not rise or fall with any one or more clauses because the anti-corruption principle inheres in the Constitution's structure itself. Even if this is correct, this position suffers from the same defects as the ones described above. Analogizing the anti-corruption principle to separation of powers or federalism only tells us that the anti-corruption principle exists, but it does not tell us the scope of the principle: does it reach elected federal and state officials, all or none, or some, and if some, which? Such analogies (at most) teach us that it is permissible to discover atextual interpretive principles in the Constitution, but such interpretive strategies do not furnish us with any guidance as to the scope of the anti-corruption principle itself. More importantly, unlike federalism, the argument for the existence of the anticorruption principle flows from the individual clauses which Teachout has so meticulously collected, catalogued, and described. If the scope of those clauses is not consistently uniform, how can we divine the scope of the anticorruption principle in the modern context of corporate campaign contributions and spending? And if we cannot, then Teachout's anticorruption principle cannot contribute to our First Amendment or election law jurisprudence.
Again, Teachout and I agree that the Constitution's text embraces an anti-corruption principle of constitutional dimension. We disagree in regard to its scope. I believe the scope of that principle extends only to appointed federal officers; Teachout believes it reaches elected officials. Indeed, last spring on Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Teachout put forward a maximalist defense of her position on all fronts.
8 Interestingly, Teachout's arguments for her maximalist position are largely clause-bound; she offers no intratextual or global assessment for her position. Teachout argues that the Foreign Emoluments Clause's Office . . . under the United States language encompasses federal and state elected positions, but she never discusses how this understanding of constitutional text would destabilize our understanding of the many coordinate constitutional provisions making use of the same or similar Office language. In this sense, Teachout's position remains woefully undertheorized. Still I am not surprised that Teachout takes this clause-bound approach. If Teachout is correct (even in regard to elected federal officials), if the Foreign Emoluments Clause's Office language reaches elected officials, then identifying the scope of the anti-corruption principle would no longer be particularly problematic. Her powerful analogy between domestic corporations and foreign governments would largely succeed on originalist grounds, and the scope of the anti-corruption principle would be readily determinable. And that is why-despite some protestations to the contrary on her part-her defense of her position and this debate remain largely about the constitutional text and history, to which I now turn. In assessing which position is better supported by the evidence, Teachout's position or mine, I frankly admit that there is some evidence on her side. I do not deny that she has met her burden of production. My goal, then, is to show that, all things considered, my view is better supported by the totality of the most relevant textual and historical evidence: evidence that was roughly contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution. It is not clear to me if this is Teachout's methodological position. It appears to me that Teachout believes if her anti-corruption principle is supported by any credible evidence, even if it is not the better (or best reading) of the totality of the most relevant evidence, then the anti-corruption principle becomes a legitimate interpretive vehicle, structural principle, or canon of construction, etc. As a normative matter, this position seems wrong. The fact that a position is historically conceivable or grammatically possible does not make it a probable or likely 13 public understanding of disputed constitutional text. And, it certainly does not make it the better (or best) understanding of that text. It would seem to me that that is our goal. Teachout has responded with several arguments. Her first theory-that the salaries of the President and Vice President were widely known and therefore not deemed to be necessary to include in the report-simply does not cohere with the known facts. 16 Yes, the President's and Vice President's annual salaries were known. They were both set by statute during the First Congress. But congressional statutes from the First Congress also set the salaries for cabinet officials.
II. THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE

A. The Hamilton List
17 Those cabinet salaries were also known. Yet Hamilton included cabinet members' salaries, but not the President's and Vice President's salaries. As for Representatives and Senators, they were paid a per diem, not an annual salary. Their salary-in the sense of what was actually paid-was not well-known. The only way to know what they were paid was to research it and report it. Yet Hamilton omitted reporting any such information-even though he did report what Senate and House administrative officers were paid.
Teachout's argument that the phrase "office under the United States" may have been ambiguous also does not help her cause. If the phrase was reasonably subject to different understandings, then Hamilton should have included close cases. After all, functionally speaking, the document's intended purpose was to aid congressional oversight and budgeting. Thus, if there were some doubt or ambiguity whether federal elected positions were Offices . . . under the United States, such positions should have been included, but they were not. Teachout could retreat by suggesting that the phrase was ambiguous, but the ambiguity-although known to her-was unknown to Hamilton, who acted on a more narrow understanding of the 15 The list included: all cabinet members and other appointed Executive Branch officers, but not the President or Vice President; clerks of the federal courts, but not the judges (which Hamilton was expressly asked to omit); scope of the phrase. Such a linguistically specific defense requires some evidence illustrating Hamilton's limited grasp of what appears to be common words and a phrase repeatedly appearing in the Constitution itself.
Teachout offers no such defense. Moreover, even if she is right and this ambiguity existed but was unknown to Hamilton, why precisely does Teachout believe her preferred meaning is better than Hamilton's (except that it accommodates a maximalist view of her anti-corruption principle)? Each of the two remaining arguments Teachout puts forward in her Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy essay-that there were other prudential or political reasons that Hamilton did not include those salaries or that the context in which the question was asked led Hamilton to think that it was not intended to cover the President or Vice President-is conceivable. But, the fact that a position is conceivable does not make it likely. To shift from the conceivable to the probable, from the possible to the likely requires evidence. Teachout puts forward none.
B. George Washington's French Gifts
While President, George Washington received two gifts from foreign government functionaries: Lafayette gave Washington the key to the Bastille, 18 and the French ambassador gave Washington a picture frame and full-length portrait of Louis XVI.
19 Washington accepted and kept both without asking for or receiving congressional consent. 20 The public knew about the gift of the key: it was widely reported. 21 Many must have known about the gift of the portrait: it was on display in Washington's anteroom, beyond which he entertained official visitors. 22 The 24 Teachout responds by proposing multiple explanations for President Washington's conduct, suggesting alternatively that Washington did not wish to subject himself to Congress's oversight and actively chose to evade the rule; that Washington's diplomatic role for the young nation prevented his refusal; that the portrait was not a "present" under then-current diplomatic conventions; that Washington believed the portrait was a personal rather than official gift; that Washington uniquely could ignore the Constitution where others could not; and that the value of the portrait was de minimis. 25 Finally, Teachout suggests: "I am not willing to take a strong stand on what Washington was thinking when he accepted the print, but it strikes me as entirely plausible that Washington acted without consideration of whether the clause applied to him, not based on a thoughtful reading of the clause." (describing the print and frame as "an official diplomatic gift"). 24 Evidence arising in connection with the Washington administration is generally considered superior to that of later administrations. First, Washington's administration was contemporaneous with the Constitution's ratification. Second, the President was a Framer and his cabinet contained other Framers and ratifiers. Third, the President saw himself above party or faction; indeed, active partisan federal electoral politics did not arise until after Washington decided not to run for a third term. Fourth, Washington understood that his personal and his administration's conduct were precedent-setting even in regard to what might appear to be minor events and conduct. Fifth, Washington both valued his reputation for probity and acted under the assumption that his conduct was closely monitored by political opponents and opportunists. There is a better, simpler view that accounts for the evidence we have without relying on evidence we have yet to discover. Washington did nothing wrong within the confines of the Constitution as it was understood in 1790 (when he accepted the key), or 1791 (when he accepted the ambassador's frame and print), or 1792 (when the Senate directed Hamilton to produce his list). We lack records voicing complaint in regard to Washington's conduct because the public had no basis to object to his conduct. Teachout is unwilling to take "a stand on what Washington was thinking." That's good-because she does not have to.
C. Teachout's Precedents
Teachout relies upon post-Washington era materials, including state materials, without explaining why this evidence is more persuasive than the Washington-era evidence.
Executive Branch Practice. Teachout correctly cites post-Washington Executive Branch practice where presidents, such as Van Buren and Tyler in the 1830s and 1840s, sought congressional consent upon receipt of gifts from foreign governments. 27 Likewise, Andrew Jackson received a gold medal from the South American revolutionary Simón Bolívar, President of Columbia. In 1830, Jackson submitted it to congressional control.
28
Nowhere does Teachout put forward any principled argument for believing that the Jackson-Tyler-era precedents better comport with original public meaning than the Washington-Hamilton-era precedents.
State Case Law. 30 This is a half century after 1789. Teachout must explain why these state law materials discussing analogous state law language are probative or should be considered in light of competing federal materials from the 1790s.
Like the presidential material which Teachout cites, the state law evidence she puts forward meets her burden of production. It is interesting, and it could be used to build a non-originalist argument for how we should interpret the Foreign Emoluments Clause, given who the American people are today and how the Republic has evolved. But many have been attracted to Teachout's work because of her repeated claim that her research and analysis is connected both to 1787-1789 and to the Framers' corruptionobsessed worldview. So, these later materials, in my view, do not make her case.
The Senate dismissed the case. 36 The modern consensus view-with some support in the ambiguous Senate materials-is that Blount stands for the proposition that members of Congress cannot be impeached. The problem with the consensus view is that even if one assumes (which is hardly clear) that the Senate dismissed the case because it determined that members of the legislature are not within the scope of the House's impeachment power, one has equal reason to assume that the House brought its charges because it believed that members of Congress were within its scope. I think this is a fair conclusion, and I see no good reason to believe that the Senate is better authority than the House.
Teachout takes this analysis one step further. Teachout's position has some grammatical support. In a federal system, under the federal entity language might be a term of art reaching the federal entity and its officials, or it might reach both the officials of the federal entity and its component states, provinces, and territories, and their officials. 46 That said, her position is against the weight of the evidence; indeed, it is entirely idiosyncratic. She points to no persuasive authority suggesting that anyone ever embraced this point of view (until she did so in 2009).
A. The Text of the Articles of Confederation and the Text of the Constitution of 1787
As a textual matter, the drafters of the Articles of Confederation were aware of this ambiguity. When they referred to the federal entity, the new national government, they used United States language, 47 Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to, referred to states they used States language, 48 and when they meant both, they used express language accommodating both. The Articles did not rely on generic United States language or the word them when referring to the States as individual entities unless there was some specific referent or preposition which put the reader on express notice. To cite just a few examples: Simply put, the drafters of the Constitution of 1787 did not rely on arguably ambiguous usage to embrace state officials.
B. Scholarly and Judicial Authority on the Applicability of the Constitution's Office-Laden Terminology to State Office
It appears that the earliest scholarly authority to have examined whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause reaches state officials is Moore's all the advantages of this union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same unless such admission be agreed to by nine states.").
48 See, e.g., id. at Teachout urges the reader to expand the reach of the Constitution's arguably ambiguous Office language to include state office, in part, because:
My own experience with politics suggests that complete awareness of grammar and its implications comes only when there are particularly highly interested parties (and there is no reason to think that there was an interested group of state officials who were aspiring to be foreign gift recipients), or debate, or a great deal more time and effort that was spent on th[e] Constitution. 53 First, there is good early American, English, and other foreign authority suggesting that fine linguistic distinctions relating to office and officer were once readily comprehended. have never heard any complaint in regard to its having left textually unclear which obligations applied to the states and which to the national government.
And if Professor Rosenkranz (writing in the twenty-first century) and Professor Moore (writing in the twentieth century) seem insufficient, we can resolve the historical question by going back to a unanimous Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore, 55 where Chief Justice Marshall, himself a ratifier, explained:
If the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first article [e.g., the Foreign Emoluments Clause], draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the powers of the general government, and on those of the state; if in every inhibition intended to act on state power, words are employed which directly express that intent; some strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the amendments, before that departure can be assumed. We search in vain for that reason.
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Of course, it is conceivable that Teachout is correct, as a matter of the original public meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, and Marshall was wrong (along with Hamilton and Washington). Teachout's analysis is not defeated by the Supreme Court's nineteenth-century ruling. Rather, the greater difficulty for Teachout is her inability to show that the voice of the nation-or any significant part thereof, or anyone at all-rose up to speak against this aspect of Marshall's opinion.
Teachout wants us to adopt her theory, not on the grounds that it is correct, but merely because she has shown that it is conceivable, i.e., grammatically Office . . . under the United States could reach state elected officials, including members of the state legislatures. But for the Marshall Court and those who came thereafter, this language has not been thusly understood. So it would seem that Teachout should not be able to rest her case on purported grammar-based ambiguity alone. All she has established is that her position is conceivable, not that it is the best understanding of the language of 1789. In 1789, the Incompatibility Clause's Office under the United States language did not bar members of Congress from holding state positions, elected or appointed. And that is good warrant for believing that the similar language in the Ineligibility Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause did not reach state officeholders. Of course, these three clauses are the primary constitutional provisions Teachout relies on. If these constitutional provisions do not extend to state office, then it seems reasonable to conclude that her anti-corruption principle-whatever its scope-cannot extend to state office, elected or appointed.
C. Contemporaneous Practice
D. Teachout and The Framers' Corruption-Speak
Can Teachout make the argument that, apart from the constitutional text, the more nebulous corruption-speak or worldview of the Framers and ratifiers is a sufficient basis for expanding the scope of the federal anticorruption principle to state office? That is an interesting question. My own view is "no." The expectations, hopes, aspirations, intent, and worldview of the founders cannot be imposed as "law," much less constitutional law, if those mental states were not meaningfully embodied in the formal constitutional text. If the Framers wanted the primary anti-corruption provisions in the Constitution to reach state officials, they had ready language at their fingertips to achieve that end. But they did not make use of any such language. The better view is that the absence of such language is some indication that the era of the Framers lacked strong or meaningful consensus in regard to extending the anti-corruption principle beyond zones expressly embraced by the constitutional text and circumstances about which the Framers had first-hand experience during the colonial period and under the Articles.
But even if I am wrong about this interpretive question, Teachout's 2009 article was understood as an interpretation of the Constitution's text, not as a meta-historical period study. For example, Justice Stevens, in his Citizens United dissent, cited Teachout immediately before and after citing to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
68 Why? Because he (and everyone else, except perhaps Teachout herself) understood her 2009 article to be an interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and related constitutional provisions. The original public meaning of Teachout's prior scholarship was that she was interpreting the Constitution's text through the prism of corruption-speak. If now she takes the position that the anti-corruption principle is supported only by the Founders' general intent or purposes or expectations, then it is unlikely that many who originally embraced her position will remain supporters.
E. Does It Matter if the Foreign Emoluments Clause Extends to State
Offices?
Teachout argues in the alternative that the anti-corruption principle remains viable even if the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach state positions:
In short, even if states were intentionally excluded, [this] does not constitute an intentional grant of greater power to 68 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51, 963-64 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (link). state officials to accept foreign gifts when representing the country, simply because they cannot represent the country. Without this intention, even if the "Constitution of 1787 liberalized the foreign government gift-giving regime in regard to state offices," this liberalization does not reflect a lack of concern about corruption. 69 Teachout's historical claim seems dubious. State government and state officials could use their powers (rightly or wrongly) to check the federal government and its policies. That is virtually the whole of the fabric of American history from the Articles of Confederation to 1787-1789, and then until the Civil War (and some might say into Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement and beyond). Is it really controversial to affirm that the Framers were aware that the national government being established was (much like its predecessor) dependent on the goodwill of state government and state officials? For example, President George Washington consistently sought the aid of state governors. He did so during the Whiskey Rebellion and he asked for assistance in enforcing his Neutrality Proclamation. 70 Again, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, state governors could fill Senate vacancies with temporary appointees.
71 If a foreign power bribed a state governor, the foreign policy implications-for war, peace, and treatymaking-are plain, notwithstanding that the governor is not conducting "foreign policy."
So, contrary to Teachout, even if a state official was not conducting "foreign policy" per se, a foreign power's bribing such a state official could have serious implications for the peace of the Republic. And such disloyalty was not beyond the Framers' imagination: Benedict Arnold, Ethan Allen, 72 Blount, and Burr. Today, the foundations of the Republic seem so secure, and these men occupy only footnotes in our history. But, it was not always so. There was a time when these men and others like them threatened the existence of our country.
If one concedes that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach state office, then it seems unreasonable to assert either that the world of the Framers was corruption-obsessed or that the scope of Teachout's anticorruption principle reaches state officials. In 1787, corruption played its part, to be sure, but other principles and policies also played a role, which 69 Teachout, supra note 2, at 37-38 (quoting Tillman) (footnote omitted What might have motivated the Framers to exempt state officials from the reach of the Foreign Emoluments Clause? I frankly admit that I do not know. Perhaps it was nothing more than the simple prudential concern of getting the state legislatures to call state conventions to ratify the proposed federal constitution. Federal monitoring of state officials, per an Articles of Confederation Article VI analogue, may have been perceived-by both state officials and the public-as a source of friction and discord. It is one thing to put state officials under the thumb of independent U.S. Constitution Article III courts; it is quite another to put them under the thumb of Congress. A Foreign Emoluments Clause extending only to some federal positions risked some corruption at the state level, but it may have made the possibility of ratification all the more likely.
Why did the Framers exempt federal elected officials from the Foreign Emoluments Clause? Again, I frankly admit that I do not know. Perhaps because they left the issue to future congressional rulemaking (for members) and to statutes (for members and other elected government positions)? Perhaps because they relied on both disclosure (i.e., Washington putting the key to the Bastille and the Louis XVI portrait on display) and elections? In other words, they relied on elected officials to act like fiduciaries. That is one answer.
Still, I think the answer may be somewhat simpler. It is not uncommon to treat those at the apex of authority somewhat differently from otherseven to exempt them from burdens which apply to others. Sometimes this is a reflection of insiders protecting their own. But, it is also frequently a reflection of deep wisdom: the kind that comes with practical experience in the world and its affairs. For example, the federal Code of Judicial Conduct applies to all Article III judges-except members of the Supreme Court of the United States. Is that because Supreme Court justices do not need ethics? No. Is it because they are better human beings, citizens, and jurists than their lower court colleagues? No. Consider recusal when judicial bias is asserted. Each justice must decide to recuse on his or her own. If an appeal to the full Court were permitted, then the minority's ability to exercise the judicial power of the United States would exist only at the sufferance of the majority. If an appeal were permitted to non-members, then you will have effectively transferred responsibility from the Supreme Court to their minders. 73 See supra note 7 (quoting the Incompatibility Clause of the Articles of Confederation and of the Constitution of 1787).
George Washington was not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. When receiving a gift from a foreign government, his behavior was public and transparent. Secretary of State Jefferson 74 was subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, and he acted in secret. Perhaps the final language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause reflects the victory of transparency concerns over corruption fears, at least when it comes to elected officials at the apex of political responsibility. 80 In other words, with regard to the specific issue of congressional authorization, they were attempting to bring the language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause back to the extant language in Article VI. What possible reason could they have had except for the fact that the people, during ratification, thought Article VI's language was mandatory, and not subject to congressional waiver? Why else would these four state conventions, and later members of the House and Senate in the First Congress proposing constitutional amendments, 81 have sought such a change? In short, the Foreign Emoluments Clause represented-in the minds of (some of) the people-a relaxation of the strictures imposed by its Article VI predecessor.
IV. TEACHOUT'S ORIGINALISM
These people opposed that relaxation: they wanted the Foreign Emoluments Clause to be as demanding as its Article VI predecessor. They did not get the constitutional amendment they sought. But, they did give us a good idea of what was the original public meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and its Article VI predecessor (as understood during ratification). The Foreign Emoluments Clause was firmly rooted in corruption concerns, but the public meaning of the text of the clause shows that other concerns trumped corruption. Teachout puts forward a maximalist interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Constitution's Office language: she argues that this clause extends to state officials and to all elected federal ones. Likewise, she argues that the change in language from the Articles to the Constitution did not effect a substantive change. This is not surprising. Once one accepts any of these textual and historical limitations on the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, one can no longer embrace a formless, seamless, free-standing anti-corruption principle. At most, one will have a textually limited anti-corruption principle: where the scope of each constitutional provision is limited to the particular wrongs that were known to the Framers or to the particular wrongs reached by each provision's text. In that situation, the anticorruption principle would have very little independent bite, much less the ability to compete with the First Amendment (i.e., to authorize Congress to regulate federal election processes).
V. TEACHOUT AND CORRUPTION
Teachout and I disagree whether the Constitution's primary anticorruption provisions reach state and federal elected officials. If they do, then Teachout's domestic-corporation-as-foreign-government analogy has weight, and her anti-corruption principle has independent bite which, potentially, could compete against the First Amendment. But, if the Office language of those provisions-the object of these provisions-does not reach elected office, then a reasonable person might also conclude that our inquiry is over. The anti-corruption principle cannot overcome the textual limitations which inhere in the very constitutional provisions giving rise to the principle.
Teachout does not agree. Rather, she argues that even if the text does not directly reach elected positions, the principle reaches them-"directly" and "explicitly."
82 But how can any principle which arises by inference work "explicitly"? What does she mean?
I think I know. For Teachout, the Constitution is not the text; it does not even start with the text. The real Constitution-the anti-corruption Constitution-is the great background consensus: the anti-corruption worldview which formed the prism through which all other ideas and ideals passed.
Teachout never expressly develops any normative framework which could transmute this free-standing atextual background consensus or I think Teachout is correct: corruption-speak dominated the worldview of the Framers, and of the ratifiers, and of the public of 1787-1789 (and of our people for a long time thereafter). But if corruption-speak was the only prism through which they could understand and communicate about the language of office and officer-if it was not a discourse they consented to, not one they actively chose, but a linguistic necessity which chose them 88 -then I do not see how Teachout's anti-corruption principle, standing apart from the Constitution's text, can have a normative claim on Americans of today.
